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The aims of this research is to analyze the effect of number of board interlocking, 
board size, family board participation, board independence, control variable such as 
firm size, firm age, and leverage, and moderate foreign ownership to number of board 
interlocking towards financial firm perfomance using ROA and Tobin’s Q as a proxy in 
non financial sector companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in period 
2014-2018. This research uses quantitative approach with two least square regression 
analysis model. The sample used in this research is firms which are listed on the non 
financial in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) on 2014-2018 period. The number of final 
samples used in this study were 366 business entities with 1830 observations. The 
findings result of this research indicate that concurrent commissioner positions have 
positive and significant effect towards ROA in non financial sector companies BEI on 
the period 2014-2018, while independent commissioners, family of commissioners, 
board size, and the interaction of multiple positions of commissioners with foreign 
ownership have insignificant effect towards ROA in non financial sector companies 
BEI on the period 2014-2018. Then variables independent commissioners, board size 
of commissioners, and the interaction of multiple positions of commissioner with 
foreign ownership have positive and significant effect towards Tobin’s Q in non 
financial sector companies BEI on the period 2014-2018, while the family of 
commissioners and concurrent commissioner positions have insignificant effect 
towards ROA in non financial sector companies BEI on the period 2014-2018.  





Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh jumlah board interlocking, 
ukuran dewan, partisipasi dewan keluarga, independensi dewan, variabel kontrol seperti 
ukuran perusahaan, umur perusahaan, dan leverage, dan kepemilikan asing yang moderat 
terhadap jumlah dewan yang saling terkait terhadap keuangan. kinerja perusahaan 
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menggunakan ROA dan Tobin's Q sebagai proksi pada perusahaan sektor non keuangan yang 
terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) periode 2014-2018. Penelitian ini menggunakan 
pendekatan kuantitatif dengan model analisis regresi kuadrat terkecil. Sampel yang digunakan 
dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di non keuangan di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia (BEI) periode 2014-2018. Jumlah sampel akhir yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini 
adalah 366 badan usaha dengan 1830 observasi. Hasil temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan 
bahwa rangkap jabatan komisaris berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap ROA pada 
perusahaan sektor non keuangan BEI periode 2014-2018, sedangkan komisaris independen, 
keluarga komisaris, ukuran dewan komisaris, dan interaksi rangkap jabatan komisaris dengan 
kepemilikan asing berpengaruh tidak signifikan terhadap ROA pada perusahaan sektor non 
keuangan BEI periode 2014-2018. Kemudian variabel komisaris independen, ukuran dewan 
komisaris, dan interaksi rangkap jabatan komisaris dengan kepemilikan asing berpengaruh 
positif dan signifikan terhadap Tobin's Q pada perusahaan sektor non keuangan BEI periode 
2014-2018, sedangkan keluarga komisaris dan komisaris rangkap. posisi berpengaruh tidak 
signifikan terhadap ROA pada perusahaan sektor non keuangan BEI periode 2014-2018. 




As the time goes by, strong business competition requires companies to 
develop a good management strategy. In order to obtain sustainable performance, one 
of them is by implementing Good Corporate Governance. The board of directors and 
the board of commissioners are part of the company's internal governance. In 
corporate governance, there can be a board interlocking which it occurs when a board 
of commissioners in a company occupies a position of commissioner in another 
company (Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013). Board interlock can be important tools 
companies use to evaluate specific strategies. Mol (2001) has stated that board 
interlocking provides boards of commissioners with wealth of experiences that serve to 
increase the company's competitive advantage such as valuable information about 
customers; suppliers; human, financial and operational resources; strategic plans and 
other corporate innovations in the business arena. Such business acumen contributes 
to the competitive advantage that companies gain and it is the primary approach for 
many companies to prevent environmental uncertainty. However, excessive board 
interlocking can undermine company performance because when viewed from the 
perspective of agency theory, board interlocking can result in the application of a kind 
of time pressure on its directors which affects the efficiency of the commissioners in 
monitoring company performance (Ficjh and Shivdasani, 2006).  
Allam (2018) and Carlos and Luis (2011) in their research have stated that 
board interlocking of a company has a positive effect on company performance, this is 
because board interlocking provides an important channel of information and 
experience transfer and an active communication method to attract funds that make a 
positive contribution to the operational and financial performance of the company in 
accordance with Kaczmarek et al. (2014). On the other hand, Delci and Ilse (2016) 
have explained that number of board interlocking gives significant negative results, in 
view of more interlocks reduce the effectiveness of monitoring activities due to 
difficulty managing time to oversee more than one company and can reduce the 
company's market value. 
In the research of Mike et al. (2015 ) and Delci and Ilae (2016) the board size 
has showed a significant positive, this is because a larger number of commissioners 
will bring better information because greater knowledge will help directors in making 
company decisions and provide more expertise, supervision. greater management, 
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and access to broader resources so as to improve company performance ( Gunawan, 
Murhadi & Utami, 2019; Carter et al, 2010). 
In Allam's research (2018), board independence has indicated positive 
significance, this is because the presence of a high proportion of independent 
commissioners can increase effectiveness in reducing agency problems (Setia-
Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski, 2011). However, Delci and Ilae's research (2016) have 
resulted in a significant negative, which means that the presence of independent 
commissioners does not contribute to company performance so that independent 
commissioners are not effective in relation to returns on invested capital. 
In the research of Mike et al. (2015) family board participation has displayed a 
significant negative, this is because family members who serve as the board of 
commissioners do not have reliable abilities to manage the company. According to 
Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), when the announcement of the appointment of family 
members to serve as the board of commissioners, the share price will decrease. This 
is by cause of investors think that the ability of these family members is still relatively 
young and lack of experiences. In Carlos and Luis's research (2011) it has a positive 
impact because of the large number of family members on the board of 
commissioners, the family can fully control decisions, policies, and the company's 
operations. In addition, with the presence of family members in the company, agency 
problems can be minimized. 
This research examines the effect of corporate governance using number of 
board interlocking, board size, board independence, dan family board participation. 
This study also includes foreign ownership moderation variables that affect number of 
board interlocking on company performance. Control variables that is used including 
firm size firm age and financial leverage (Gunawan, Murhadi, and Utami, 2019). 
Based on the background , the following problems are formulated : Does 
foreign ownership as moderating variable affect the number of board interlocking on 
company performance? Does the board size have a positive effect on company 
performance? Does board independence have a positive effect on company 




The objects used in the study are Indonesian non-financial sector companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which have audited reports for 5 
consecutive years for the 2014-2018 period. The research sample was Indonesian 
non-financial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 
period 2014 to 2018. The sample was determined based on the following criteria: (1) 
non-financial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 
2014-2018, (2) issuing financial reports which completed and had been audited 
regularly in the 2014-2018 period, (3) the availability of data on all necessary variables 
during the 2014-2018 period. Based on these criteria, a research sample of 366 
companies was obtained. This study used multiple linear analysis to examine the 
effect of several independent and moderating variables on the dependent variable. 
The independent variables in this study were the concurrent position of commissioner, 
size of the board of commissioners, family commissioner, and independent 
commissioner. The moderating variables were foreign ownership and the dependent 
variable in the form of Return on Assets and Tobin's Q. 
Model 1 : 
ROAit = 𝑎 +  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿 𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2. 𝑈𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3. 𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽4. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽5. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽6. 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒        (1) 
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Model 2 : 
Qit   = 𝑎 +  𝛽1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿 𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2. 𝑈𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3. 𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4. 𝐾𝐾 + 𝛽5. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  +
 𝛽6. 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒        (2) 
Model 3 : 
ROAit = 𝑎 + 𝛽1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2. (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿 𝑋 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3. 𝑈𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4. 𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
   𝛽5. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7. 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9. 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒  (3) 
Model 4 : 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2. (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿 𝑋 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3. 𝑈𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4. 𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
   𝛽
5
. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7. 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽8. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9. 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒   (4) 
 
Information : 
ROAit         : Return on Asset of company i in period t 
Qit         : Tobin’s Q of company i in period t 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡        : Concurrent position as commissioner of company i in period t  
(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿 𝑋 𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅)
𝑖𝑡
 : Interaction of foreign ownership wit concurrent positions  
           comimissioner 
𝑈𝐷𝐾𝑖𝑡         : Board size of commissioner of company i in period t 
𝐾𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡         : Independent commissioner of company i in period t 
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑡                 : Family of commissioner of  company i in period t 
𝐹𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡         : Foreign ownership of company i in period t 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡        : Size of company i in period t 
𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡         : Age of company i in period t 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡           : Company debt of company i in period t 
e         : Error 
𝛽         : Regression coefficient 
𝑎         : Constant coefficient 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 shows the results of data processing for models one and three with the 
dependent variable is ROA. 
Tabel 1. Regression results for the dependent variable ROA 
Variable  Model 1 Model 3 
β t β t 








KK 0,002 0,640 0,002 0,642 
INTERL 0,005 1,932* 0,004 1,676* 
UDK 0,003 1,084 0,003 1,070 
FSIZE 0,004 1,633 0,004 1,639 












INTERL x FOWNER   0,001 0,220 
R Squares  0,046 0,046 
Adj. R-Squared  0,042 0,041 
Note : * = 10% significance; ** = 5% significance; *** = 1% significance 
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Based on the data in table 1, it can be seen that the KIND variable has no 
relationship to ROA. This is supported by the research of Al-Matari et al. (2014) and 
Farida et al. (2010) which stated that independent commissioners have no effect on 
company performance based on ROA. The independent board of commissioners has 
no effect on company performance, this is possible because the presence of 
independent commissioners in the company is only a formality to fulfill regulations. The 
existence of independent commissioners is not to carry out a proper monitoring 
function and does not use their independence to oversee the policies of the directors. 
In addition, the minimum requirement for independent commissioners of 30% may not 
be high enough to cause independent commissioners to dominate the policies taken 
by the board of commissioners, so that independent commissioners are less effective 
in running the company (Farida et al., 2010).  
The KK variable has no relationship to ROA. This is supported by the research of 
Mohammed Hasan Makhlouf et al. (2018) which explained that the family of 
commissioners has no effect on company performance based on ROA. The more 
family representatives who sit on the board of commissioners do not improve the 
company's performance because the competence of the board of commissioners is 
only standard and in supervising is less effective.  
The INTERL variable has a significant positive relationship to ROA. This is 
supported by the research of Allam (2018) and Carlos and Luis (2011) which 
elaborated that concurrent commissioner positions have a significant positive effect on 
company performance based on ROA. This is explained in Allam (2018) which stated 
that the existence of multiple positions of commissioners can provide channels of 
information and transfer of rich experiences that serve to increase the company's 
competitive advantage through disclosure of information by the board of 
commissioners about customers, suppliers, human resources, people, finance and 
operations, and other corporate strategic plans and innovations, in the business arena. 
Board members use their reputation and personal connections to bring necessary 
external resources to the company. Given that the resources found in any company 
are limited, third parties that provide access to external resources are advantageous 
for the company so as to improve the company's operational performance.  
The UDK variable has no relationship to ROA. This is supported by the research of 
Allam (2018) and Kiel and Nicholson (2003) which stated that the size of the board of 
commissioners has no effect on company performance based on ROA. Based on the 
results of several previous studies, the optimum number of a board of commissioners 
is seven to eight people (Jensen, 1993) or eight to nine people (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992). In the Indonesia Stock Exchange, it was found that the average size of the 
board of commissioners was 4.21, which is below the optimum value. Lacking number 
of commissioners can lead to a lack of certain competencies and skills, which can 
hinder optimal decision making. These decisions that are not optimal will certainly not 
have any impact on company performance. 
The FSIZE variable has no relationship to ROA. This is supported by the research 
of Simon (1962) and Whittington (1980) in Kumar and Kaur (2016) which declared that 
company size has no effect on company performance based on ROA. Profitability 
stands alone (independent) from the size of the company. This is because both large 
and small companies have the same opportunity to get a profit, but the size of the 
profits they get depends on the company's investment opportunities and opportunities 
in the market. 
The FAGE variable has a significant positive relationship to ROA. This is 
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supported by the research of Allam (2018) and Carlos and Luis (2011) which 
expressed that company age has a significant positive effect on company performance 
based on ROA. This is explained in the research of Allam (2018) and Carlos and Luis 
(2011) that the longer the company has been established, it means that employees or 
company workers have learned to be better and more efficient and have a competitive 
advantage in the core of their business and encourage organizational success in 
improving company operational performance (Arrow, 1962; Jovanonic, 1982).  
The LEV variable has a significant negative relationship to ROA. This is supported 
by the research of Carlos and Luis (2011) which stated that debt has a significant 
negative effect on company performance based on ROA. This is explained in the study 
of Carlos and Luis (2011) that a high level of debt indicates a higher probability of 
bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986). The non-optimal use of debt in the company's investment 
financing will lead to inefficiency of the fixed costs borne by the company due to debt. 
In other words, the tax savings enjoyed by the company have not been matched by an 
increase in investment returns so that the interest cost on debt weakens the 
company's profitability. The large debt reflects a higher fixed expense in the form of 
interest costs. The amount of this interest expense will decrease the company's profit. 
The FOWNER variable has no relationship to ROA. This is supported by 
research by Chibber and Arbor (1999) which described that foreign ownership has no 
effect on company performance based on ROA. The results of research conducted by 
Chibber and Arbor found no significant correlation between foreign ownership and 
company performance at ownership levels below 51%. The result of the research 
showed that the average level of foreign ownership held is 13.09% in which it is lower 
than 51% so that foreign ownership does not affect the company's performance.  
 
Table 2 . Regression Results for the dependent variable Tobins Q 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobins Q 
Model 2 Model 4 
β t β t 
Constant 3,917 3,873 4,034 3,972 
KIND 2,066 4,348*** 2,066 4,349*** 
















FAGE 0,010 2,873*** 0,009 2,761*** 








INTERL x FOWNER   0,196 2,084** 
R Squares  0,023 0,026 
Adj. R-Squared  0,020 0,021 
 
Table 2 shows the results of data processing for models one and three with the 
dependent variable Tobins Q. The moderator variable has no relationship to ROA. 
This is supported by research by Chibber and Arbor (1999) and Mike et al. (2015) 
which explained that the moderator has no effect on company performance based on 
ROA. From the results of the research conducted, the moderation variable that 
belongs to the classification of potential moderation in which the foreign ownership 
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variable and the interaction between multiple positions of commissioner and foreign 
ownership are not significant to ROA, so that foreign ownership variables do not 
moderate the dual position of commissioner to ROA. In statistical data, the variable of 
foreign ownership is only 13.09%, which means that the role of foreign investors is not 
enough to make the commissioners who are concurrent improve company 
performance. This is because foreign investors lack of power to make the members of 
the board of commissioners progressing, in transferring their experience and 
information to the company, so that it does not strengthen the influence on company 
performance. 
Based on data in Table 2 can be identified KIND variables have a significant 
positive relation to Tobin's Q . This is supported by research Allam (2018) which stated 
independent directors provide significant positive effect on the performance of 
companies based on Tobin's Q . Independent commissioners contribute effectively to 
company management by maintaining different perspectives and representing 
stakeholders. Companies with independent commissioners will produce better 
performance than other companies without independent commissioners, because 
independent commissioners are able to supervise and control the company's internal 
operations through the application of supervisory authority. A larger proportion of 
independent commissioners can improve management control more effectively, 
alignment between managers and shareholders, and company performance (Ertimur 
et al., 2010).  
The KK variable has no relation to Tobin's Q. This is supported by research Tri 
Puput Komalsari and Muhammad Alfin Nor (2014) which stated the family 
commissioners does not effect on the performance of companies based on Tobin's Q. 
This can be seen from Table 4.2 shows that the average family of commissioners from 
the study is only 0.6208 or less than 1, which means that most companies in Indonesia 
do not have members of the board of commissioners, thus family of commissioners is 
less able to influence the value of the company. 
The INTERL variable has no relation to Tobin's Q. This is supported by the 
research of Omer et al. (2013) which explained that duplicate the commissioners had 
no effect on Tobin's Q. This shows that the commissioners who concurrently have an 
information channel and the transfer of experience that more or less influences the 
decisions in a company. According to Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited 
Liability Companies, article 108 paragraph 4 states that the board of commissioners 
consists of more than 1 (one) member as an assembly and each member of the Board 
of Commissioners cannot act individually, but based on the decision of the Board of 
Commissioners. As a result, the information provided by the commissioner cannot 
influence the decisions of other board members and will not affect firm value.   
The UDK variable has a significant positive relationship to Tobin's Q. This is 
supported by research Vincent and Nicole (2010) which elaborated that the size of the 
board of commissioners significant positive effect on Tobin's Q . The more the number 
of commissioners in the company, the better, because the more people monitor the 
behavior of management so that they will always act according to the wishes of 
shareholders (Dalton, 1999). The more the board of commissioners, the more input to 
the board of directors, so that the options obtained by the board of directors are more 
and more. Therefore, increasing the number of commissioners can improve company 
performance (Dalton et al., 1999 in O connel, 2010).  
The FSIZE variable has a significant negative relation to Tobin's Q. This is 
supported by research Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) in Darmadi (2013) which said that the 
size of the company's significant negative effect on Tobin's Q. This is explained in the 
research of Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) in Darmadi (2013) that larger companies can 
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cause inefficiency which results in poor company performance (Klapper & Love, 2004). 
In addition, large companies are under the control of managers who pursue their own 
interests and therefore maximizing profits as a function of company objectives is 
replaced by a function of maximizing managerial interests so that it has a negative 
impact on the company (Pervan & Visic, 2012). 
The FAGE variable has a significant positive relationship to Tobin's Q. This is 
supported by studies Cecilia Audrey (2018) which described that the age of the 
company significant positive effect on Tobin's Q. This is elaborated by Kartika (2009) 
in Efriana Mustika (2012) that the more established or mature the company, the better 
the company's performance. In which, investors have a positive perspective on the 
company that an established company is able to survive through economic fluctuations 
and market conditions.  
The LEV variable has a significant negative relation to Tobin's Q. This is in line 
with the research of Fosu Samuel et al. (2016) which explained that the debts 
significant negative effect on Tobin's Q. This is written in the research of Fosu Samuel 
et al. (2016) stated that the bigger the debt, the bigger the investment risk. The high 
debt ratio shows that the company is not solvable, which means that its total debt is 
greater than its total assets (Van Horne, 1997). Debt is a ratio that calculates how far 
the funds provided by creditors are also a ratio that calculates how far investors see a 
company with high assets but high leverage risk, so they will think twice about 
investing in the company, because it is feared that high assets will be obtained. of debt 
will increase investment risk if the company is unable to pay off its obligations on time. 
Variable FOWNER has no relation to Tobin's Q. This is supported by research 
Chibber and Arbor (1999), which states that foreign ownership does not give effect to 
the performance of the company based on Tobin's Q. The results of research 
conducted by Chibber and Arbor found no significant correlation between foreign 
ownership and company performance at ownership levels below 51%. The results 
showed that the average level of foreign ownership held was 13.09%, which means it 
was lower than 51% so that foreign ownership had no effect on firm value. 
Variable moderator has a significant positive relationship to Tobin's Q. This is 
supported by research of Artha Vijnana (2017) which stated moderator gives 
significant positive effect on the performance of companies based on Tobin's Q. From 
the research conducted, moderating variables held including the classification of 
authentic moderation where the variable of foreign ownership is not significant to 
Tobin's Q and interaction between concurrent position as commissioner with foreign 
ownership significant to Tobin's Q, so that foreign ownership moderate double position 
as commissioner on ROA. Foreign ownership directly affects the position of 
commissioner and firm value. This is due to the presence of foreign investors also 
contributes to monitoring the management of the company, especially for 
commissioners who have multiple positions in other companies, thus it creates a 
pressure on management to serve stock interests. Companies with interlock status are 
also empirically proven to have good financial performance, in this way it has an 
impact on investor confidence, and it is hoped that market performance will improve 
because investors put trust on the reputation of the board of commissioners (Anderson 




Based on the results of hypothesis testing using the t test (partial), it can be 
seen in model 1 and model 3 that the double position variable of commissioners and 
company age has a significant positive effect on ROA, the debt variable has a 
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significant negative effect on ROA, the independent commissioner variable, the family 
of commissioners, the board size of commissioners, company size, foreign ownership, 
and interaction between multiple positions of commissioner and foreign ownership 
(moderation) have no effect on ROA. Based on the results of hypothesis testing using 
the t test (partial), it can be concluded in model 2 and model 4 that the independent 
commissioner variable, the size of the board of commissioners, the age of the 
company, and the interaction between multiple positions of commissioner with foreign 
ownership (moderation) have a significant positive effect on Tobin's Q, the variable 
size of the company and debts significant negative effect on Tobin's Q, family 
variables commissioner, double that of the commissioners, and foreign ownership has 
no effect on Tobin's Q .  
This study has limitations, those are the year and several research variables 
used. For further research, it is expected to be able to do the research based on newer 
years and increase the number of variables. 
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